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From Western Europe to Europe

Egon Bahr



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
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FROM WESTERN EUROPE TO EUROPE*

EGON BAHR

Introduction

If we had met in 1946 or 1919, in both cases one year after a World War, we would have been confronted with similar questions as today: what would the new world order be like and what should be Europe's role at the end of an epoch?

This is the subject of the four lectures contained in this paper. We are facing the end of the East-West conflict, which is the end of that 40 years long era also called Cold War. On the other hand we find ourselves at the end of the historical experiment, which started with the October Revolution in 1917.

Europe can heave a sigh of relief. The Eastern threat is over, the potential one by weapons as well as the one by ideological demands. New problems and risks have occurred, however. Theoretically we have always wanted exactly this, but practically we are entirely unprepared to face the new situation.

That really demands a new way of thinking. All apparently secured convictions, rules and goals have to be reconsidered. I am far from presenting ready-made concepts for the new world order, but possibly there is an orientation for such concepts by analyzing the changes and by drawing some conclusions.

International security after the East-West conflict is the first subject that will be discussed. I will deal with the relation between the world powers, the experiences after the Gulf War and the possible future role of the United Nations.

The second lecture is about *Europe after the East-West conflict* and treats the consequences of the end of military confrontation, questions of integration and disintegration of existing organizations, new conflict sources, special interests of individual states and the role of the Atlantic Alliance, CSCE and the European Community.

The third lecture deals with *Germany after the end of the East-West conflict*, i.e. the break-down of the GRD, the problem of welding two societies and especially the problem of welding two armies, developed and

* Four lectures given in the framework of the Jean Monnet Chair Lecture Series of the European Policy Unit, European University Institute, October 1991

integrated in opposition to each other. I shall try to give some prospects on Germany's future role in the new world.

In the fourth lecture, finally, I will talk about *armament and disarmament* in the new world, including the role of nuclear weapons, of conventional disarmament in Europe, the new weapon systems, the principle of modernization and finally the auspices for *a new European peace order*.

1. International Security After the East-West Conflict

The reasons *why* the allies of the second World War have become opponents, exercising a policy of brinkmanship, will not be dealt with here. America, with its monopoly of nuclear weapons, was able to develop a strategy of massive retaliation, to organize an alliance of conventional defence including the Federal Republic and to give the incentive for economic recovery of those parts of Europe that were able to accept their help by the ingenious Marshall Plan. When, at the end of the fifties, the Soviet Union developed the intercontinental missile and America became vulnerable for the first time in its history, Washington logically developed the strategy of flexible response by smaller nuclear weapons with the possibility to limit war to Europe only.

Even if America has always been qualitatively ahead of the Soviet Union with the development and introduction of new weapon systems, the Soviet armament reached quantities that made the US qualitative advantage practically ineffective. Both super powers obtained what the Americans rightfully called mutual assured destruction (MAD), the assured second strike capability. This remains valid even today. The development of this rivalry with mutual vulnerability resulted in the common interest of security against error and a limitation of the armament spiral, the continuation had become senseless. One might describe this phase as global nuclear conspiracy with continued global rivalry, which resulted in the nuclear test stop convention, the ABM treaty and the SALT negotiations. China appeared on the scene as a potential global nuclear power with all those complicated reflexions that the perspective of a triangle involves. The Soviet Union had established itself claiming to be a world power with equal rights. From a security policy point of view, the difference between these two and all the others increased instead of decreasing and was nowhere more obvious than in the two satellite systems in the space indispensable for the observation and prewarning against strategic systems with their flight duration of only 30 to 35 minutes. The laws of physics thus prevented Western Europe from developing its own comparable system, if it had the ambition to become a third world power.

This bipolarity has now come to an end. Perez de Cuellar has said he sometimes felt uncomfortable with two super powers; with only one it could be even more so.

America is the only remaining super power, if a super power is defined by its capability to perform sufficient power projection at any spot on the globe. The Gulf War has shown the United States also as the first conventional power being able to apply successfully superior technology. It was logical that President Bush and NATO called the Soviet Union a friend after the end of the East-West conflict. I remember a Soviet friend, who predicted in 1986: 'We are going to do the worst, we are going to take away the enemy from you.' And that is where we are now.

Everybody has to reconsider things. America has achieved its goal: second to none, but what is the use of their superiority?

The only point that could be debated would be the elementary wish of America to become once again invulnerable. This led to the SDI-programme, a dangerous project during the era of confrontation, since the rival had to consider whether to use the possibly last opportunity before the vulnerability window would be closed and the superiority would be re-established that America had at a time when it possessed nuclear monopoly. SDI would no longer constitute a threat against the friend and partner of a future world order: he who withdraws from a race need not fear the victory of the quicker one. All the same the question remains: why the immense expenditure of intelligence and money, if there is no longer any threat?

It is cheaper and easier to approach a controlled disarmament of strategic systems so radically, so that the smaller nuclear powers cannot avoid cooperating by opting for a well balanced minimal quantity of nuclear missile systems, in order to deter adventurers with nuclear ambition and in order to make waterproof the non-proliferation convention. One hundred of such systems in the United States and the Soviet Union together with 20 in each one of the small nuclear powers would still be sufficient objectively in order not to let the idea of deterrence die, but would not be considered as a threat and might build the bridge to common control of minor reserves that might remain necessary against those who want to break the achieved nuclear peace.

In the new epoch of history I see a real chance to remove the lethal threat that mankind has created through the invention of nuclear weapons. The military industrial complex is more important in the Soviet Union and more powerful in America. Resistance and intrepidity towards the possible perspectives of the new era are more visible in the Soviet Union and less audible in America. It is indeed an urgent challenge for politics to direct intelligence, energy and the capability of this military industrial complex to the new fields of problems of our existence.

In any case America's responsibility has grown with its power. The cautious handling of it is all the more advisable, as all peoples and states are well aware of this fact and become freer in pursuing their own interests, the more it is obvious that none of them is a threat for America.

We are going to experience an interesting reorientation in Peking, however. During the past decades Chinese foreign policy was determined by the principle of equidistance from both hegemonical powers. If one knew that, Chinese policy became quite calculable. Now one of the hegemonical powers is gone. A rapprochement of China to the Soviet Union could be observed already during the Gulf War. When visiting Peking, Gorbachov was able to conclude collaboration with the Chinese, which could become potentially even closer than before the break with Mao, because a Soviet hegemonical policy is no longer feared. Of course there is the Chinese irritation after the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party. Chinese Communists as the governing party are like relics from another era. But, independent from any effects on the interior development of China, I expect that this country will follow its traditions and its national interests, where it will meet Russia: two countries, who have grown relatively weaker, will support each other.

The end of the East-West conflict will have considerable consequences on the world of independent countries. Non-alignment has become meaningless if the blocs do not exist any more. The beginning of the discussion was interesting, that in the future the non-aligned countries would rename themselves as 'bloc of poverty', which hits the truth.

The end of the East-West conflict put an end to the possibility of performing basic reorientations, as did the Egyptian Presidents Nasser and Sadat, who, after they were in close touch with the Soviets, now rub shoulders with America. Transforming or exploiting the East-West conflict is over, nobody can expect any profit, like for instance Haile Selassie or Mengistu. The threat to get the weapons refused by the West from the East, can no more be made to come true, as it happened in Angola. Cuba will not send any expedition corps. India might loosen up its ties with Moscow and Washington might not consider necessary to support Pakistan as much as before. Washington and Moscow are trustworthy when they stop delivering weapons to Afghanistan.

As the East-West conflict exists no more, it cannot be settled any more in the Third World. But these states will not only loose their former political alternatives; they will win new space for minor regionally limited conflicts. Liberia is an example, South Sudan another one, people will die, because the world is looking away, does not feel threatened and can wait until local passages of arms have suffocated with their own weakness. For the world the end of the East-West conflict bears less danger. That is something at least! But that does not mean that the world becomes more attractive.

The countries of the Third World will win new space, because their request for economic participation, for justice, for equal chances and social balance can no longer be suspected of being guided by Communism. In the future they will only address their requests to the differently rich countries. Of course the Soviet Union was blackmailed, too, and they suffered it gladly as long as they thus won influence. Freed from the monster of the communistic striving for world power, the West alone will be put under pressure to help in order to avoid the masses' pauperization from growing uncontrollably.

The pauperization of masses - wasn't that the beginning of that movement, which started with the Industrial Revolution and ended with the October Revolution in 1917? We are in the middle of a new industrial revolution, which is not only restricted to Europe this time, but is a global one. Without a super-power Soviet Union this can lead to a renaissance of social movements from the Third World, which would be the more dangerous, as they would be unable to threaten with arms, but with the despair of people who have nothing to lose.

At the horizon a world emerges in which the Soviet imperialism has left the field to the imperialism of the rich alone, in which there are no Communist governments and a new social revolution does not ask for anything but the values the West is that proud of and after the end of former Soviet Union even more proud. It might be time to think about the strategy for avoiding a social revolution taking its force from the principles of justice and international law.

In the coming generation capitalism will have to prove that even without the challenge by Communism it is able to justify its ethical value to create a life in dignity for a major part of the people. Money alone as superior standard for success will not be sufficient. Capitalism, too, will perish and follow Communism, if it does not become capable of reformation sufficiently to suffice its moral claims.

Africa, which is at our doorstep, will retain our special interest. Almost all states have given up Leninism-Marxism as official ideology. Europe was too busy with itself to realize the immense changes on the Black Continent. An African Perestroika has taken place. Already in July 1990 the OAU Summit concluded a Democratic Charter with the main issue of: 'Putting the people first.' This should be the guideline of all future policy. What a wisdom, after the people in Berlin had removed the Wall one year before and the people in Moscow had prevented the Putsch one year later.

We now experience a power-political retreat from Africa by the Soviet Union, at least a break in their relations, but a retreat by the United States at the same time. Ken Adelman, an expert on African affairs and Head of the American Arms Control Agency under Reagan, does not look upon Africa as a model for success offering inspiration and orientation. Africa seems not to be interesting for both super-powers, the more as its share in

the world's economy amounts to scarcely one percent. Africa on its own wins the freedom of starvation, and at the end of the East-West conflict its chances for an economical and political new start are minor. A sociologist from Kenya has formulated: Democracy cannot be produced like Nescafé. This applies to the Soviet Union, too, by the way. But how can democracy develop, if not even the necessary raw material for its production is delivered? What else can people do than migrate to the products, if the products do not come to them? We have experienced that in the former GDR and we shall see the same phenomenon in Eastern Europe and in Africa, too. Migration is the weapon of the poor, which does not shoot but hits.

Before we turn our attention to the United Nations, we should analyze some of the results of the Gulf War, that would not have ended as it did without the end of the East-West conflict. The Soviet Union did not make any use of its veto-power in the Security Council and has thus enabled resolutions permitting America to demonstrate what it is able to do and what it is not.

What it is able to do is impressing indeed. After the Gulf War America is the most important power conventionally, too. Though under especially favourable geographic conditions, we have experienced a war that has absolutely no parallels in history. Comparisons between the Gulf War and the technique of the Second World War would only make sense if one compared it with the Crimean War as well. At the end of the sixties an American Joint Chief of Staff spoke of a soldier's dream soon to become true, to control day and night each square mile of an overlookable theatre of war which can be covered by constant firing with high-precision weapons almost simultaneously with its observation. In the Gulf we experienced the first electronic war, hopefully the last one, too. Anyhow, technique and tactics applied there would paralyze Europe within a very short time. Our highly civilized and cabled social order would be pushed back by 100 years within one hundred hours into the 19th century, even if we were so incredibly lucky that all of our approximately 200 nuclear reactors would remain unharmed. Conventionally, too, Europe is no longer capable of warfare, if it is a matter of using the most modern conventional arms on its territory.

The air-land battle tactic - which has been rejected by Germany for good reasons - was introduced by the United States in their forces and applied in the same way like the follow-on-forces tactic, which means blows against the second echelon in order to avoid the supply of fresh troops. Europeans can be happy that they were spared the proof that America applied their most modern means in their own interest, independently of whether the allies would join them. This is only a statement, but no reproach. Strategic fighters have started in the States, were supplied with fuel under way, have performed their task over Iraq and theo-

retically they could have reached Soviet territory within further one to one and a half hours. The Soviet Union has seen this, analyzed it and drawn conclusions. Their militaries can have no doubt that their country can only keep up the balance with nuclear weapons and that on all other fields it is too weak economically in order to catch up the growing American advantage.

America was unable to gather its incredible war machinery in such short a time at the Gulf without the structures of NATO and without its bases in Europe, its troops in Germany and the arsenals of the Federal Army, in which American officers felt as if it was Christmas when they selected weapons and ammunition.

From the important book written by the British historian, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, it can be concluded that during the past 500 years there have well been big powers that have risen and fallen. One characteristic of the decline was the overstretching of power. In former times, when super-powers were not strong enough, they took allies and paid them subsidies. In the Gulf War it was the contrary: the United States asked their allies for subsidies and received them. The interesting dispute if they got more than they spent, is not interesting. It is only interesting that the United States on their own were unable to afford the Gulf War.

In this century we have seen the fall of the British and French Empires, the destruction of the German Reich with its claim to rule Europe and the implosion of the Soviet Empire. As to America, it seems as if the old saying is becoming true: God does not let any tree grow to the sky.

Anyway, at the end of the East-West conflict America is not well prepared for a task, that can be defined as follows: no new world order will be maintainable without a sound world economy. The impressive military force of the United States after the Gulf War does not help in any way. The problems America is facing are immense: it has to settle its deficits in the budget and trade balance and start a policy not to remain the world's biggest debtor nation, and it has to solve its internal political structural problems. It is most improbable that the United States will solve these problems while the President is working on his re-election. After that it will become harder, but more necessary. America has lived beyond its means. It will have to economize and will be unable to raise its living standard for a few years: no doubt it is strong enough to solve these problems in themselves, but it is in a bad position for the reconstruction of the world economy that has now become necessary.

From the security-political point of view the United States at the end of the East-West conflict balances between arrogance and retreat. The arrogance results from the triumph of victory, the retreat from the knowledge of having done a necessary job well. From experience none of the extremes will win. Their troops should be cut in half. The closure of 200

overseas bases is advisable. The reduction of their strategic troops concluded in START is an economically welcome discharge, without precluding any option. So after the big opponent is gone, America prepares itself to expect that a new danger is emerging and wishes to maintain the capability of performing operations à la Gulf War.

President Bush has drawn his conclusions along the lines: confrontation on a lower level, maintaining all options for the future, searching for secured superiority, increased cooperation in the nuclear field.

Like the American Secretary of Defense his new Soviet colleague sees his priority in maintaining the stalemate situation in the field of strategic nuclear weapons and the entrance to space.

By the way, the Soviet Union needs armament discharge, further reduction of conventional troops, considers to reduce military service from 24 to 18 months and to develop some sort of mixed army composed of professionals and draftees. The Soviet Union has remained of equal rank because it has kept the mutual assured destruction (MAD) capability. Insofar it is safe. On the other hand it is a regional power, gaining importance by its dimension, and furthermore it is a developing country, and the Soviet Union is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations with power of veto.

When I recently met the first Russian Foreign Minister since 1917, I pointed out to him that the power of veto was not divisible or multipliable by 10. The Russian Foreign Minister confirmed that it would be reasonable to expect that the Union of Sovereign Republics would furthermore dispose of the veto-right. Of course, this also applies to strategic weapons. And the navy, too, cannot be divided between the Ukraine and Kazakstan and the space centre of Baikonur is the starting point for the Soviet space control and observation system, of which a similar one is only owned by the United States.

Now we approach the consequences of the end of the East-West conflict on the United Nations. Its increasing number of members has now reached 166 and can go up to 175 without modifying the basic structure of the Security Council with its five veto powers.

When the United Nations were founded in 1945, a world order for all states and peoples was hoped for and it was designed to be a powerful instrument against disturbers, with a general staff, troops, the obligation to support its members in case of need and the means to pay for it. Armed force was only to be applied in the common interest, according to the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations. Individual and collective right of defence is valid until collective security measures put an end to the aggression. As long as this did not function, regional alliances were admissible (according to Article 51). Finally the Security Council with its right of veto was established against misuse. As we know, instead of a World Order the East-West conflict developed. None of the two op-

ponents could be allowed to be outvoted. Therefore the veto-right became an instrument of salvation for the United Nations, as the loser on any given occasion was saved from having to quit the organization.

The United Nations were blocked from solving any important problem, any part of the East-West conflict, by majority votes. In the very moment the mutual blocking of both super powers ended, the success of the General Secretary began, who was finally able to apply principles that had been forbidden to him so far. After the end of the East-West conflict the question arose of whether one could not return to the plans of 1945. If one should not begin to carry out, what has been provided in Article 7 of the Charter, if the General Staff Committee consisting of the five permanent members, which has existed symbolically since the summer of 1948, will now become reality and receive political meaning. It would have to elaborate for which kind of possible mission what kind of troops are needed, so that the United Nations can keep the auxiliary instrument of the Blue Helmets who are in practice guarantors of cease-fire as long as the two parties agree at least: furthermore the member states should keep troop contingents ready for such actions, who have to be trained together, although this does not create any presumption of their participation or not in an acute case. The United Nations should be put in a position to re-establish peace by means of power, if all other actions fail.

On the other hand the community of nations should no longer be obliged to delegate the right of applying military force for the purpose of righting violent breaches of international law. This kind of actions should be performed under the command and control of the United Nations - politically as well as militarily.

To establish a world order means to protect generally conceived rights concerning the relations of states. In other words: the alarm about the Gulf War should be an incentive for putting in the hands of the United Nations the instruments provided in their Charter, which means to replace the right of the stronger by the strength of law. That is historically necessary and after the end of the East-West conflict even possible, I believe.

The United Nations were thus to become the collective instrument of the states, and this was intended in 1945 already. The system of collective security and the power of veto mutually exclude one another. After the end of the East-West conflict majority decisions with a renunciation of the veto-right are thinkable in all cases of conflict, in which vital rights of one of the five permanent member states of the Security Council are not involved. But this will not be sufficient for a world order, which could only be called *order* if the powerful are not treated differently from the less powerful. In principle a system of qualified majority decisions replacing the power of veto has to be elaborated. If you are imagining an

action of the United Nations within the former Soviet Union, in order to prevent or terminate war between independent Republics, you might suppose that Moscow is even wishing for such an intervention and does not make use of its veto-right. But it is difficult to imagine Washington renouncing its veto-right in case of a planned UN-action against the US for having violated international law.

In all probability these problems are more likely to be solved in 2010 than by the year 2000. It is also thinkable that the problems of collective security will be solved earlier in Europe than globally, the more because the United Nations have started to resolve the contradiction between the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states and the people's right of self-determination.

Just because there are no criteria for it, just because the states will tend to consider the established international law as more reliable - at least more stabilizing - the modification of the Charter will probably only become possible when the package is tied up that enables global reforms of the Charter for a new era.

For the new era the question emerges: should the winning powers of World War Two maintain the special rights they granted themselves 50 years ago for another period of 50 years? Does one have to have nuclear power in order to be admitted to the small club of the privileged? In Germany there is no tendency to question the renunciation of ABC-weapons that Adenauer declared and that all Governments since have reconfirmed. No country can be advised to strive for weapons they cannot use. Insofar the power of the five veto states is based on nuclear weapons, they resemble dinosaurs whose size and mass cannot protect them from extinction. Shall the world of the next 50 years be built on the principle of nuclear threat? Against whom? Against nuclear weapons? Nowadays no nuclear power is the enemy against whom these arms would be employable.

What is the source of the veto privilege? Moral qualities, economic weight, number of population? In no case would such criteria lead to the present group of the five permanent members. If rights are to become the base, however, on which the people's community is going towards the next millennium, no special rights can be deduced from the past, the nuclear equipment and the military power of a state. Special rights could result from the services a state is rendering in favour of the international community and in the interest of collective security for everybody, and the economic development of the world community depends on whether the gap between poor and rich will be minimized convincingly and if we are able to stop endangering the environment.

In reality America is needed and abused at the same time in its role as world policeman. This will remain unaltered for quite some time, at least as long as there is no reliable collective security system of the United

Nations. The veto system will function even while such a system will be established, all the more as none of the five states is demanding to get rid of the privilege. Its restriction and the transition to a system of weakening the veto power as a step towards its abolition should be pondered in order to enable the United Nations to meet the task the world has assigned to them in 1945. In any case it is a historical challenge for the United Nations to become a global organ of collective security. And now it is time to start.

2. Europe After the East-West Conflict

Europe is facing the beginning of a new era. It is difficult to determine what the most important reason for it is: the end of the East-West conflict or the end of Communism. The leadership of the Soviet Union and the iron discipline of the East-West conflict had frozen peoples and states into the cold of unfreedom, which brought stability and calculability at the same time. Now, as everything is melting, we recognize the peoples with their old problems, desires and conflicts, that were only suppressed. The old problems reappear, the old passions only slept. The Balkanization of the Balkans shows features which are no longer decisively characterized by the old order of the old alliances or neutrality.

All the same it is impossible to start again where the deep freeze box of the Cold War began to effect its simulated hygiene. Nothing is as it was before. The 50 years have taken effect by the mixing of ethnic groups, through the development of an economic structure that did not have any regard for it. The mixtures have increased, in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union. In that huge country there are many potential Yugoslavias. What we see there, could be easily compared to what we might expect in the former Soviet Union.

This country remains of utmost importance to the future development of Europe. Let us turn to this subject first. The reasons for the breakdown of Communism can be reduced to a single one: it is impossible to alter human beings. It is a fascinating idea, with a claim to be valid worldwide, to create a society without conflicts between classes and in which each individual can live according to his capabilities and needs.

During the negotiations that I had to lead at the beginning of the seventies with the GDR for the basic treaty, I have predicted to my partner the collapse of communism. Of course he denied this with indignation. And of course he was curious to hear how I could prove my statement. We are still able to understand what Sophocles, Plato and Thucydides and other Greek philosophers have written. We remain familiar with the will to power, the care for security, love and hatred, the wish for property and wealth, with envy or jealousy. In other words: basic structures of

human behaviour have not changed, as if Jesus Christ had never lived. The admission of Christianity not to have altered mankind, did not lead to its end, because, among other reasons, it promised paradise only in the afterlife. Communism, however, wanted to create paradise on earth. That is why they had to rebuild man according to the image they had of society. The dictatorship of the proletariat wanted to force men to do what an idea had defined their happiness. A breathtaking arrogance condemned to failure. So far, that is during the almost 70 past years since the October revolution, this was not that successful; anyhow Lenin's conviction, according to which labour was given priority within the society, being the way and destination of each individual, was not generally prevailing in the Soviet Union. But I admitted: perhaps there had not been enough time and I suggested to meet again 500 years later. If communism was more successful by then, I would willingly take off my hat.

I did not expect then that the collapse would take only 20 years. It started to accelerate in 1986, when Gorbachov denied to the Communist Party the monopoly of truth. 'We need democracy as much as the air to breathe' - that is the contrary of dictatorship of the proletariat, proclaimed by a man who was still General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but who basically assumed a social-democratic position and anticipated which way in the history of the labour movement had prevailed historically

Concern *about* the Soviet Union has been replaced by concern *for* the Soviet Union. This fantastic shift characterizes the end of an epoch, that started in 1917 with the October revolution and ended with the peaceful revolution of August 1991.

In this connection I would like to express my fear of false hopes and illusionary expectations, that have emerged in the West as to the development of the former Soviet Union. Ultimately, democracy sees the human being in its centre with his strengths and weaknesses, that is why it is so elastic-flexible and successful; people in Moscow and Leningrad have prevented the putsch. They found men in Yelzin and Sobtschak, who became speakers and executors of their will at the right moment. The elementary will for democracy has not yet created democratic structures. The vacuum of power lying in the streets was filled with decrees. So far Yelzin has not forgotten what he learned from Lenin. I don't want to discuss here the subject of how the new structure of the former empire will be construed. But I cannot imagine any democratic stability without political parties calculable within government or opposition and capable of taking responsibilities. After the miserable and - measured by its own claims - shameful resignation from history of the CPSU a vacuum has occurred that cannot be filled by 150 parties.

In such a situation a strong hand is demanded. Authority against chaos would be close to an authoritarian position which could find the lack of

democratic structures comfortable. This tradition is even older than Bolshevism in Russia.

Are we facing dictatorship for introducing democracy right now? This question might seem absurd to western thinking. On the other hand, something similar has already functioned in Nigeria. It could well be that this is the only way resulting from Russian tradition, which is not a democratic one, as tsardom was no democracy and neither Stolypin nor the Duma had left behind lasting traces.

What Gorbachov has begun, was a revolution from above. He started it knowing that without decisive reforms the Soviet Union would lose its race against America. During the first discussion I had with him in April 1985, a few weeks only after he assumed office, I was deeply impressed by the depth of his recognition that wars were no longer winnable, that disarmament had therefore become possible, without endangering the security of his country. That was, by the way, the main argument by which he was able to convince the reluctant militaries. Common security for East and West should become the foundation on which economic reforms, *i.e.* Perestroika, would develop. In our conversation Gorbachov's conviction emerged very clearly, that Glasnost, *i.e.* freedom of expressing one's opinion, would be the lever to burst the incrustations of Stalinism, in order to set free the communist idea so that it would have full scope for developing its vigour. Of course, a reformator, who wanted to be a heretic no more than Luther, had to refer to Lenin but Gorbachov himself wanted to return to Lenin, that means, he was a communist believing in the reform capacity of the idea.

In this connection it is important that the people who are engaged in the revolution from above are imprinted by the communist way of thinking and by the experience of the system; that is true for Yelzin as much as for Shevardnadse or Yakovlev. Even the man of the new generation, Sobschak, who cannot look back on more than one year in the Party, has experience of life and the corresponding categories of thinking of a typical Soviet and not those of western democrats. He is a child of the Soviet Union. The mentality of the revolutionaries from above is not shaped by the west and they cannot get it however much they might look westward.

For the revolution from below, that has not at all took place during the first years, this is even more true: it was not the case that the masses felt freed after the proclamation of Perestroika and Glasnost and could finally let their initiatives sparkle like champaign which can no longer be tamed by a cork.

During his visit to Moscow this summer President Bush, in view of the past, has renounced offering magic formulas to his host taking account of the past. He said instead: 'You must find your own kind of democratic capitalism in accordance with Russian culture and its values.' This wise

statement towards Gorbachov is also valid for all democratic successors of the former Soviet Union.

We experience daily in Germany what kind of damages the system has caused in the thinking and behaviour of men. The citizens of the GRD, who are not separated by linguistic barriers and who are fixed on the old Federal Republic and familiar with tv and radio programs and thus with advertising and problems of prosperity, demonstrate as citizens of the Federal Republic how hard they find the reorientation of mentality. Self-responsibility instead of waiting for instructions, risk instead of inconspicuous precaution characterize alternatives of the break. Under the former system they said: I want, because I must; the key to success is now: I must, because I want. Self-responsibility instead of adaptability - East Germans find this break in mentality very hard. But how much harder it must be for the Polish, Czechs, but also Lithuanians or Estonians, who were not that close to and familiar with the West? But these people have a collective memory of a former democracy which the peoples of the Soviet Union cannot have. Not drawing attention and exercising caution, wait and see and be careful, these were the rules of survival proved to be good for centuries. It is completely impossible to alter mentality in a very short time. We must not expect superhuman things of people who have suffered so much.

That means also that in foreseeable future we must not expect a situation, neither politically nor economically, measured by the usual criteria of West-European states. For a long time the state's corridor in the former Soviet Union will remain much broader. Areas controlled by the government economically, will comprise not only aviation and railways and postal service, but also raw materials and key industries. The stratum of middle management does not exist and the upper management is quite scarce. The private sector of enterprise will grow from below and from above there should be something growing towards them.

Anyway, as far as I am concerned, till 1995 I do not expect any comparable democratic party structure in the former Soviet Union and till the year 2000 no economic structure comparable with Western Europe.

This implies, as to our help, that we cannot make assistance dependent on the establishment of comparable market economic structures. This would resemble the position of a man, who will throw the safety belt to the drowning only after he has learned how to swim.

There is another factor: supra-national collaboration instead of purely national independency is the progress of Western Europe. Of course, there still exist national interests, but they are no more the focal point of the nations. In other words, the interests of Italy, France and Spain and even of Great Britain are better off within the European Community than without. Freedom, prosperity and security are no longer obtainable within the limits of nations. In the Soviet Union, the opposite is perceived

to be the case. There, nation is the focal point, in order to obtain freedom and security against the centre and its oppression, combined even with the hope of gaining prosperity that way. The Soviet Union had frozen its national conflicts hoping that the bacillus would die in a social order where not only classes but also nationalities no longer played any role. The end of the system shows clearly that the nationalities' genes have survived the deep freeze box. They have remained most alive, including arrogance, stupidity and even their closeness to fascism.

National identity as the most important reference point belongs to the 19th century. A big problem of the Soviet peoples will be solved if they recognize that their national interests are best taken care of in a supranational structure, from a security point of view as well as from the perspective of economic progress.

Here Western Europe can help, first by transmitting our experience, but even more by the readiness to welcome the peoples of the huge country in Europe. If we refuse this, we confine and isolate them and would be co-responsible for nationalist clashes, after the former clinch of the central state with its valid although imposed ideology has been abolished without replacement. The reference even for Soviet nationalists can only be Europe. What else? The collapse of the centre and the breakdown of the autocratic party with its values cultivated in 70 years of power have left behind a vacuum. Into this vacuum the nation will rush, more precisely the dozens of opposing nations, if it cannot be filled with European principles. German 'Ostpolitik' was based on the principle that self-determination of the German people had to come second to the interest in securing peace. German and European interests were identical.

We had the satisfaction of seeing this principle been taken adopted almost word by word in the final act of Helsinki: renunciation of force for the modification of borders, and furthermore human rights, rights of minorities and ethnic groups. Renunciation of force must remain the principal European law, for the Soviet peoples, too, and all national ambitions have to be subordinate in the interest of stability which these peoples need even more urgently than Europe. But this presumes that the Charter of Paris remains valid, which mean so to speak, that Europe embraces Russia and does not reject it.

Whether this will function is most uncertain. New putsch attempts are improbable today, but cannot be excluded definitely tomorrow and the patchwork carpet of nations is much more colourful and complicated in Russia than in Yugoslavia.

It means demanding a lot at one go: very briefly the Soviet people have to become market-economy-orientated democrats and citizens who measure their conduct by European and not national standards.

To achieve this in a short lapse of time requires a majority of supermen, but not the people that exist. Principally, this big country will have

to find its own way in a political structure and an economic organization; Europe could only help to avoid the national conflicts, if it brings the European perspective within reach.

Besides the problems of its internal development resulting from tradition and mentality, the country will have to solve the question of its governmental structure. Here, we will essentially be observers only. From a European point of view it is evident that this country should remain united as far as possible, except for Republics like Georgia, Armenia and Moldavia and the Baltic States, that means, it should retain a central competence, which would make it easier to solve problems of security and economic questions.

As to the issue of security, it is clear that all the Republics respect the obligations resulting from contracts concluded so far by the Soviet Union, and it is equally clear that further disarmament will become the more complicated the more new sovereign Republics have to balance or take into consideration their own interests towards Russia.

Our economic interest is obvious, too. After all, the main support will be coming from Europe and not from America. For 70 years, the infrastructure has been developed according to the common interests of the Soviet Union. It does not really matter that Georgia is producing essentially wine and for instance is getting its telephones from one of the Baltic Republics, which produces 70% of all the telephones in the Soviet Union. Political self-determination does not automatically lead to economic autarky.

Which kind of economic perspectives has a country, which is producing mainly wine and is hoping for payment in Western European currency, where - as we know - they also produce some wine. We are familiar with drinking in Russia, but drinking for Russia would be something new!

The American interest sounds quite different: the more states the Soviet Union has, the less danger for us, Henry Kissinger says, because each centralistic state would develop expansionism again. That is why he wishes as much decentralization as possible. That reminds us of a general, who after a war is reflecting on the next one and wants to avoid the mistakes of the last one. While America might still see some strategic rivalry with the strategic power of Moscow, there is none of this kind for Europe any more. Europe has no global rivalry with the new Union. Now that the German question had been solved, the Russian question has emerged for Europe. The Europeans are concerned about Soviet risks, which are less vital for America because two oceans separate them from the protagonists of risks.

It must not be leadership that Europe claims against the new Soviet Union, but European interests are nevertheless strong enough not to submit to US leadership, if these American interests will determine the attitude of the United States, as can be expected. It is part of the new po-

litical situation in Europe that between Russia and the former West, states have emerged whose governments are legitimated by elections and orientate themselves towards the West.

When the European Community, or more exactly, the Western European Community, was founded, a seat was reserved there for these states and they were promised that they would take their seat the very moment they obtained their self-determination.

Now they can and they want to, although nobody has the necessary money to finance the quick entry of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary into the Common Market, but these countries need a transitional period different from the GDR. So it was right that the Federal Government helped them to have the perspective of becoming a member of the European Community. All handicaps to economic collaboration expressed by the COCOM list have to be abolished at once, because these countries and former potential opponents have now become partners and allies of free democracy.

Economically these countries want a market system; politically this means the same orientation as the one we know from the EFTA-countries, but starting from much worse conditions. They move towards the Common Market and must not be refused, as we want democracy to succeed there as we had wanted it in Spain, Portugal and Greece. All doubts against their accession are untenable. Whether this economic Europe will get together with different difficulties, in varying intensity or step by step by association, is now less important than the knowledge that Common Europe has come into being now.

All plans that lose the perspective of all-Europe would be built on sand. Insofar nothing will be as it was before, or in other words: due to the European division Western Europe was able to be an 'Isle of Happiness', which turned its back on the East and cared only for raising its living standards and prosperity. Now we realize in Germany how costly it is, to try to help our East on their way to the same prosperity we have in the West, although it is in fact not that expensive after all. This experience the Western European Community will make globally. If we are not prepared to renounce any further increase of living standards for a while, it is not even mathematically possible that the East will ever catch up with us. And if that is not the case, the people, who have moved so much already, will start to move more. Then the principles of a constitutional state will be required in order to solve the problem. Shall we use weapons and build up effective border barriers, after the western request for freedom of movement has succeeded triumph? Cuts in prosperity, changes of our constitution or closing down the borders? In principle one can say, that in Germany nobody wants any of these three alternatives. The promise of free movement could turn out to be hypocrisy or stupidity. Stupidity can be excused, hypocrisy is unforgivable. How else can this problem be

solved than by a policy, by which the people in the East gain trustworthy confidence that remaining home will be worthwhile? Maybe this could be combined with quotas for immigration agreed on the level of the EC.

That must not and will not handicap Western Europe to push forward its projects of becoming union and implement them as planned. We shall have to develop a Europe of different intensities: the old European Community, as the centre, a second circle of variably dense associations including the Baltic Republics and finally the countries of the former Soviet Union, collaborating with the perspective of an all-European economic area.

Without delay we should now start to envisage negotiating all-European structures in the field of energy, traffic links, communications, common environmental regulations and - last but not least - a European Institute of Standardization. Standardization might be one decisive factor for economic cooperation.

At the end of the East-West conflict a new situation has occurred from a security policy point of view. Conventionally the Soviet Union is no longer a threat. In the next two decades no attack is imaginable, of the kind that NATO feared up to yesterday. NATO has only a very small border to Russia, in Northern Norway. Furthermore, NATO's member countries are surrounded by a circle of states - from Norway to the eastern border of Turkey - which direct their view and hopes to the West.

This means that Europe does not need any longer the physical presence of American troops to defend itself conventionally. And - by the way - Europe would still have the benefit of the American strategic weapons, even if America were no longer physically present.

But for political and psychological reasons we require the American presence, though without its security political dominance. It is unacceptable for Europe and America as well, if with a fraction of their present troops the United States dominate the future security structures, as if Europe were unable to do this on its own. In my Institute we had interesting discussions with an official American, who said the same as the former Foreign Minister Henry Kissinger, that it is neither desirable nor possible for America to maintain its former dominating position in Europe.

A self-determined Europe can welcome American troops also under European leadership. The strategic nuclear competence would remain unaltered as before, but America will have to make up its mind, if it will remain in Europe only under the condition of leading the alliance. Europe must no longer be afraid to ask this question, as the design of a European house wishing to have America as a fellow-lodger has to be performed by European architects.

The competence of NATO reaches as far as the Polish border, and the Soviet elite troops are stationed on NATO soil in Germany, which the

alliance always intended to avoid, but nobody is worried about it. After their retreat no foreign troops will enter this region and the German troops in East Germany, being under exclusively German authority so far, will then be fully integrated into NATO. The alliance will then become for our Eastern neighbours a guarantee factor for security against Germany. The sovereign advance concession of the Chancellor to reduce the German troops to 370.000 soldiers has gone ahead of the Vienna Conference and has thus fulfilled the classical purpose of an advance concession: others will follow with considerable reductions of their troops.

The suggestions of the NATO ministers of defence concerning the development of new air-based missiles are within the decades-long continuity of American interests to dispose over nuclear weapons able to reach the Soviet Union without needing to use strategic weapons. This represents the continuation of old confrontative imaginations, even if the argumentation pretends that provisions have to be made against a missile threat from the developing countries in the South, that does not even exist so far. If this were confirmed by the Government chiefs, it is easy to imagine the Soviet answer; it could create not only a new potential threat for West Europe, but a renaissance of the just ended confrontation.

This is the really important decision to be taken by forthcoming summits: is there a new issue of a potential enemy or all-European collaboration in the field of security too; will the Charter of Paris be taken seriously or will it be broken only a few months after its signature; will the borders of the European split be overcome or only be pushed further east; will Europe be freed or become a prisoner of continued confrontation under the motto 'second to none'?

It belongs to the changed security situation that the aimed-for conventional balance between East and West has been reached on paper, but lost in reality, as the German separation does not exist any more, on top of which this balance has been calculated. The Warsaw Pact got lost. It existed just long enough to sign The Paris Treaty and to be formally dissolved four months later with the striking result, that the Eastern superiority existing so far has been replaced by a Western superiority towards the Soviet Union. 30 divisions are missing on the Eastern side of the balance. That was never intended, but is a fact.

From a potential deployment zone against the West the three East-Middle-European states have become a security zone in favour of the West, if one thinks in old east-west categories, but this is exactly what we must not do. What are they then? Neutral? Even though they strive for Western social and economic systems, and historically neutrality has lost its sense at the end of the East-West conflict?

It is understandable, if NATO hesitates or refuses to give guarantees for these countries which the Soviet Union might consider as a threat. If they do not feel threatened neither by the east nor the west today, this can

only be an intermediate stage comparable to the situation in East Germany, as long as Soviet troops exist. This security-political floating condition, which could be called a vacuum, can not be lasting. If a western decision can not be taken against and without these countries, this means practically, that Prague, Budapest and Warsaw put the decisive weight on the balance for future European security structures most certainly as soon as Germany discovers its security interests being identical with those of the mentioned countries.

Doubtlessly this would be the case, if after the suggestion by the NATO ministers of defence the Soviets would give a classical answer. Because then not only Germany and Denmark, but also Poland, Hungary and the CSFR would encounter a new, identical potential threat. The real situation, the real interests of these European countries will develop their normative force. That means either the three above-mentioned Middle-East-European countries get into some kind of relation to NATO, in fact a guarantee relation, or an all-European security structure will be created including the Soviet Union. If these countries cannot and must not be stopped in their drive for the West, the political perspective will be against the Soviet Union or at least without the Soviet Union or with the Soviet Union. The answer is not difficult, as long as we stick to the Charter of Paris.

This is probably the really far-reaching decision of these months: does Europe remain America-orientated from security policy point of view, or does it find the force for self-determination? This matter will be decided by Germany. The well-liked 'as well as', by which Bonn has helped itself over the past decades, would practically mean a decision in favour of America, which pursues its security-political interests until today with all attributes of apparent sovereignty and with admirable continuity - admittedly: as well as comfortable. But if not now, that the Soviet Union is neither enemy nor opponent, when then should Europe's emancipation take place of an America, without whose help Europe would never have obtained the chance to emancipate, take place?

If not now, in a state of maximum weakness of the Soviet Union and of maximum power of the United States, when should Europe ever live without America's guardianship, which even America itself does not want to assume forever?

Europe has to treat the Soviet Union as a European partner and Europe can do this precisely because America remains the global strategic partner of Moscow.

This will have consequences on the considerations concerning a new NATO doctrine. Should we abandon the defence doctrine in favour of an intervention doctrine? Should the undenied readiness for defence be complemented by the readiness to interfere outside the alliance? In the East, maybe in the Soviet Union, in the Balkan states, in North Africa, the

Near East, in one of these regions or globally undefined? Such a doctrine would change fundamentally the character of the alliance. Loyalty towards its present values would exclude in my opinion the German consent to such changes. Especially if it is performed invariably under American leadership and NATO would thus become an instrument of global American interests. Each doubt or refusal to participate in interventions would be turned into a question of reliability and faithfulness towards the alliance.

As soon as these two questions have been decided upon: all-Europe and European self-determination, all problems can be solved that are now still existing in confusing profusion. Among them the discussion concerning the WEU, which is not a real woman, but an artificial figure-head: it has no structure, no command, no troops and will not be able to get all this, if it does not want to blow up NATO.

A WEU as a debating club for political coordination of the Europeans would not compensate for its defects, but would increase the animosities of the Americans who would feel excluded. On the other hand the WEU is a child of the Cold War and of confrontation, not less than NATO. It has to face the same problem of including Eastern Europe in its thinking, and not as an object. Whether NATO or WEU will be organized without considering Eastern Europe, does not make any difference politically. It is not a matter of chance that the cautious interests of Middle-East-European countries regarding contact, collaboration, coordination will reach the alliance as well as the WEU without formal guarantees. If Europe's self-determination shall not have an anti-American drive, it is advisable to restructure NATO in order to make it an alliance under European leadership including France and with an American presence. If East Europe, more precisely the Soviet Union, was defined as out of area, rebellion would be appropriate, because Germany must not break the Charter of Paris. It would not be in our interest to torpedo the CSCE process. NATO is an alliance of states but no state's alliance not entitled to decide somehow sovereignly about interventions outside of its area, whereas the smaller ships of the European armada would have to follow the battle-ship USA.

We shall see whether NATO will not be able to devise its strategy in coordination with the East and go about its planning in cooperation with the East in such a way that an extension including the Soviet Union will no longer be an utopia, but will become a real prospect.

This would be a possibility, which may be faster to realize than the development of all-European structures from the CSCE, which would remain the only alternative, if NATO shuts itself off or continues developing confrontational features.

This problem becomes quite clear in connection with Yugoslavia: how shall the former Europe (West) handle nationality conflicts? First of all it

has to be admitted that Europe is not at all prepared for such problems. This is all the less a reproach as the entire international community, including the United Nations, is not prepared for it. The problem has erupted at the end of the Gulf War triggered by the unfortunate Kurds, who are living in five different states: the Soviet Union, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Such problems are not new of course. Collective shame is appropriate, as the world accepts for years a war containing racial and religious elements against the black peoples of South Sudan. Issues that TV is not interested in obviously do not receive any priority in the States' Chancelleries. In the case of the Kurds the world was conscience-stricken.

Massive violations of human rights can no longer be hidden behind the barriers of state sovereignty. Since our world is as it is, we are experiencing the world's enthusiasm under the motto: long live the people's self-determination! Precisely in Germany, which was able to put into practice its right of self-determination, this tendency is especially big. The world would drown in chaos, if the principle of 'Self-determination *Über Alles*' would replace the principle of 'Germany *Über Alles*'. There is no definition of how many souls a people must count with their own language and identity, in order to be entitled to claim self-determination with governmental independence. Anyway, no different standard can be applied to Nagorny Karabach than to Northern Ireland, nor can we submit the Evenks in far-away Siberia to different rules than the near-by Tirolians.

Whether and if so when the principle so far embodied as the international right of sovereign states will be modified by the right to self-determination of peoples is an open question, which I cannot answer. It applies also to the United Nations, because the answer has to be accepted by the community of sovereign states which is changing the Charter of the United Nations in order to enable them to accept the new right. Just because we do not have any structure in Europe, in which the right of veto is embodied, it could well be that Europe will find an answer to it within the CSCE earlier than the United Nations. This is a big field for urgent academic and political research.

In the Charter of Paris the CSCE had just decided upon a very weak system of crisis management when we were surprised by the civil war in Yugoslavia. Not even an office was functioning in Prague. Whoever loads a baby with a knapsack, must not be astonished if the baby collapses. The fact that CSCE is not yet able to carry such a knapsack provokes unjustified public astonishment and criticism. Now crisis management in Yugoslavia has been delegated to the European Community, because - very wisely - a corresponding majority decision by the CSCE cannot be blocked by veto. After all, the European Community has well-functioning mechanisms, even though they are as little designed and prepared to settle conflicts outside the European Community as those of the CSCE. The

European Community thus resembles a trainee doctor who is expected to operate on a perforated appendix.

Without wanting to decide on or expecting an economic boycott aiming at the complete isolation of Yugoslavia - which by the way the European Community cannot do on its own, since Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria would have to participate - one is struck by the idea of considering the use of military force. That is very old thinking, indeed.

Who should employ this force? The CSCE has not a command structure and troops of its own at its disposal. If one day it should come so far, the CSCE intervention troops would become an instrument of enforcing the law valid within the Community. If NATO forms such intervention forces, this would be an instrument for out of area interventions. The same applies to the Western European Union (WEU), which would have to rent such troops from NATO. The question of an international legal basis for interventions outside NATO and WEU territory would of course imply the problem whether one should also intervene elsewhere in the East, where - as already indicated - many Yugoslavias are in store.

So what will happen if there are civil wars or wars between one or the other of the new republics of the former Soviet Union? During the era of the East-West confrontation this was easy to handle. Both sides respected the status quo, each side was responsible for tilling and preserving order in its own yard. In the case of the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, there were strong and justified protests, but - as 12 years earlier in Hungary - nothing happened. Under the cover of bloc stability there was room for neutrality or a position of non-alignment, or even more: the neutral states took advantage of the security guaranteed by both alliances. After the end of the East-West conflict it has become meaningless. The end of the confrontation has also eroded neutrality.

Of course, in the past, as now, we were not indifferent to events in Eastern Europe, but up to now there has been no legal basis for the West to draw upon, if it should want to intervene.

One should not pretend that there was already a European home with corresponding house rules and a caretaker paid by all members. In case of wars in the former Warsaw Pact-countries there is only the UN with its instruments of using force.

The CSCE is not a ratified treaty, but a formulated intention, which has brought about significant political effects with a view to their becoming valid under international law, but which must still be converted into a treaty.

There are two pillars on which a future stable Europe must rest. The first pillar is the renunciation of force as a mean of modifying existing borders; the second one is the right of minorities and peoples within the existing borders of states.

History cannot be undone. When we debated the Munich Treaty 20 years ago, Prague demanded from us a statement that it had been invalid from the start. We could not give such a statement. It was injustice from the beginning, but even Czechoslovakia will of course not reverse the expulsion of more than one million Sudeten-Germans, which occurred at the end of the war. The same is true for the Poles who live in Lithuania or the Russians in Latvia or the Armenians in Azerbaijan or the Croats in Serbia or the Serbs in Bosnia. It is known already today that at the end of the civil war in Yugoslavia living side by side and the mixing of diverse ethnic groups and minorities will continue, no matter whether existing borders remain or are modified on a consensual basis.

In Europe, in the East as well as in the West, nation and nationality may no longer be number one on the priority list of political values or structures. Historically speaking this is the test and the chance for Europe after the end of the East-West conflict, for a Europe that wishes to attain self-determination.

3. Germany After the End of the East-West Conflict

I would like to introduce the subject of Germany after the end of the East-West conflict by saying something about the development which has led to German Unity.

To begin with, it is a fact, that the West Germans did not insist upon the unification. There was no impatience. In the old Federal Republic everybody lived comfortably and was speaking about 'brothers and sisters', sent parcels visited one another and regretted, that history had put them on the wrong side. We did not have any plans. One year after the beginning of the constitutional Unity, it can be seen almost daily how little we were prepared. Three weeks after the Berlin Wall fell on 9th November 1989 - the person behind the decision still remains an open question - the Federal Chancellor offered to his colleague, Modrow, the possibility of negotiations concerning a contractual alliance that should lead to confederational structures. On 3rd December 1989, nobody ever thought, that the first all-German elections would take place just one year later.

The people in the East wanted the Unity. This is quite understandable. For the smaller part, the more afflicted part, it was crucial, for the very reason, that after the fall of the Wall, a mass exodus began towards the West, and nobody could stop it, neither the Americans, the French, the British nor the Soviets. The German people in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had forced the Unity.

In spring 1990, the Federal Chancellor recognized the situation easily enough and reacted with real courage. Courage, insofar as he literally stepped over the borders dividing German sovereignty, and to this extent

in breach of international law: he negotiated the Unity with the Soviet Union and decided, together with Gorbachov, security-political conditions for the German Unity. Gorbachov was clever enough - or weak enough - to do the inevitable, and preferred to offer it to the Germans, rather than give it to the three Western powers. These powers could do nothing but applaud a Unity whose establishment had been their declared goal, until then, an unkept promise.

Basically, the Two-plus-Four negotiations were only a confirmation and formal execution of reserved rights or the rest of original rights, which had terminated the sovereignty of the *German Reich* with the unconditional surrender in May 1945.

In international law, Germany only obtained its sovereignty this year, following the ratification of the Two-plus-Four Agreement in March.

Security for Germany, and security against Germany were two aspects equally valid of the epoch of separation and determined by the separation. The same aspects apply to the Unity. As such it is comforting to see that something very important has remained unchanged, given that so many others have altered.

Gorbachov accepted the extension of NATO up to the Polish border, as NATO meant control over the German forces, and thus security for the Eastern neighbours of Germany. Kohl accepted, that foreign troops would not enter East German territory, even after the retreat of the Soviet Army in 1994, and in an unilateral advance concession an unprecedented decision - he agreed to the reduction of the German troops to 370.000 men. In no less superior style, he took over social democratic requests which he had resolutely fought against until then: the Social Democratic Party had endorsed the requests of the Palme-Commission for a nuclear weapon-free corridor in Germany, in order to obtain a nuclear weapon-free strip reaching from the North Cape down to the Mediterranean Sea. This now will become reality, as will freedom of chemical weapons, although there still does not exist a banning treaty with worldwide validity.

So, whilst the foreign and security policy aspect of the German Unity can be considered a unparalleled success story, the internal and economic are complete disasters so far, but nevertheless condemned to success.

It was Chancellor Kohl's mistake to introduce the D-Mark over night, from first July 1990 and without any economic provision. All experts had warned him of the consequences which have since occurred. We had given the Spanish and British economy years to prepare themselves for the fresh wind of the Common Market, whereas the GDR economy is expected to perform over night, an impossible prospect. The whole of Eastern trade of the GDR has broken down, as - obvious - none of the COMECON-countries was able to pay in 'hard' currency. GDR production has broken down, because a Volkswagen is cheaper and better than a

Trabant. Even the agricultural production has been directly affected, because the East Germans believed that a Western egg was better than an Eastern egg and the East Berliners preferred rolls from West Berlin.

A lot of money was needed in order to compensate all that. When Lafontaine was speaking of one billion of DM a year ago, he was believed to be crazy, not only because this sum seemed to be incredibly high, but also because he was saying it during the election campaign. At the same time, the Chancellor promised no tax increases and to the new compatriots, that no one would be worse off, but better off. During the past 12 months 140 billions of DM have been transferred, tax has been increased and unemployment in Eastern Germany has not even reached its peak so far.

The early introduction of market economy in countries with a planned economy is terribly expensive. To request a radical move towards market economy, pushes a country to disaster, not only because it does not have a rich 'big brother', but also because all the available money of the industrial states would not suffice for the countries of the former Soviet Union to attain a level comparable to the transfer into the former GDR.

Something else can be learned from the German experience to date: the physical removal of the Berlin Wall has not yet removed 'the wall' in the people's minds. In the West, many people think of tax increases, in the East, many feel that the Western people are condescending. In the West, they think that the Easterners should at least work. In the East, one points out that they had at least had some work to do before, and that they had attained a better living standard than their Eastern neighbours. In the West one might easily find everything from the East miserable, and in the East they say it was not that bad after all. Of course, I have simplified the problem, but the fact is: after the unification a divided nation has emerged, instead of a separated country. In the meantime, we see in Germany, something that can be seen in Europe and all over the world; proprietary rights and the all-consuming desire to change everybody else except, for oneself. This kind of attitude cannot prevail.

Capacities and interests determine what a country is able to do or wants to provoke. But the foreign political weight of a country is based on its interior political strength. It begins with the stability of its constitution, a minimum of social political consensus and economic power. That is where the difficulties of the Federal Republic start, and they are precisely created by the Unity we have always wanted. A country, which used to be a stronghold of stability with 60 million inhabitants, considering that there have been only 6 chancellors, a low number of strikes and low inflation rate, now has to face completely new conditions with an increased population of 76 millions inhabitants.

With unemployment approaching 50% in one part of the country, and migration which has not yet been stopped, Germany has become a poten-

tially instable country. In the light of these factors, the difficulties are compounded by the mental melting process between both parts of the country, which leads to growing animosities towards each other. I therefore come to the first conclusion:

The creation of interior Unity takes absolute priority over all other factors. Even if the new East-German countries do not become a flourishing landscape in the next three years, equality of rights and chances reaching equality as far as wages, salaries and pensions are concerned, have to be implemented during the current legislation period, if we want to avoid a long-lasting traumatic and divided mentality in my nation. One could express this as follows: the return to stability and a minimum social political consensus is the priority task of German policy.

This implies also an internal reconciliation. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has said in his Government declaration: 'To accept this is especially difficult for those who have suffered, but without reconciliation, we would only rebuild and consolidate the walls, that have been pulled down in our thinking'. I also share this opinion. It includes the idea that even the principle 'justice, not revenge' has to be buried. I am thoroughly convinced, that no good will come for my people, if legal authorities are occupied until far into the next century with clearing up individual injustices, which have been committed or suffered, without ultimately being able to obtain full justice. No good can result from letting the past or even the Stasi or any other secret service poison our future. Not only mercy, but also reconciliation goes before justice, and even if this once again will spare hangers-on and opportunists. This is the price to be paid for reconciliation.

Reconciliation is easy with equal-minded people or among friends having had minor differences. But reconciliation is difficult between opponents and strangers, or those who snubbed each other or even fought against each other. But that is where reconciliation is required most of all.

The reconciliation of Germany demands equality of opportunities and a firm promise not to penalise any people who have not committed wrongs nor caused harm for which they should go to court, unless they have committed a very serious crime. We should be open to all those people, in order to give them the chance to start anew politically.

Practically speaking, this will not be a problem for people who are still resolute Communists today or who want to preserve their ideals, who do not want to run away from their past, out of pride or self-esteem, even if they doubt it secretly. I have a high respect for such people.

On the contrary, we shall have to deal with fellow countrymen, who either started to doubt earlier and feel free right now, but want to find out what can be saved from the old ideals in the new era, people, if you like, who did belong to the conservatives in the former GDR and now stand on the left.

For me there is only one requirement: democracy, as the political will of a majority is the aim of Social Democracy. Freedom, Unity and solidarity are basic values to be balanced in each new situation, but as the guidelines of all our decisions. No matter where they are from, be it Leninism-Marxism, the Sermon on the Mount, or the ethics of Enlightenment, as soon as one agrees with democracy and the basic program, one would be able to become a member of the SPD. The tradition of tolerance demands the chance of a new start for everyone, who is willing to comply with it. That means reconciliation, is the part of Unity or unification, which can and should be offered openly by the Social Democratic Party to our people. Both, the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liberals (FDP) have now assumed similar positions. Anything else does not make sense.

After the War, no other principle was applied. I felt disgusted when Adenauer became the Commentator of the Nuremberg Laws' Chief of the Chancellery, but for sure it was a sign of integration and it was *appealing to voters*. Should Eastern Germans be judged more harshly 40 years later, after all the difficulties they have encountered? The Tribunals of the four winners do not exist any longer. We shall have to judge ourselves, how Germany is going to treat Honecker if Moscow frees him, or how to deal with the successful former head of intelligence, Markus Wolf, after he surrendered to the authorities.

The principles of a constitutional state are applicable; nobody can be sentenced by laws which are not applicable to him or her. Honecker has not betrayed the GDR. There is no penalty without law. It is doubtful if our criminal law is able to judge political guilt.

The head of the intelligence service does not become guilty when he is doing his job according to law; this applies to all authorities worldwide. So far nobody can prove the contrary, in Markus Wolf's case, when he says: 'My hands are not stained with blood.' Anyone who has worked for him in the GDR or has been sent to the West by him, cannot be harmed; on the other hand, a West German, who has worked for him in the old Federal Republic, has committed treason as a spy, and must be condemned. It is a long way to Unity and justice!

Four frontier soldiers are on trial under the charge of having killed men, who tried to get over the Wall, although the four soldiers were following firing orders confirmed by the Warsaw Treaty member states. Shall the big shots remain unmolested and the little men be hanged?

We cannot dismiss all judges and teachers in East Germany. We have not even decided upon an attempt to write a German post-war history, which can be taught in all schools. No individual can be condemned belatedly for not being a hero. This applies to authors, priests, scientists, opportunists, as well as dissidents among them, who - like most others - had to accommodate themselves to a lifelong separation.

These are some of the problems of the Unity, but to be quite clear: scarcely nobody wants to go back to the separation. On that point, there is entire agreement in the West and the East.

During the final months of the GDR, I worked there as a consultant in the Defence Ministry and tried to help solving the tremendously complicated task of merging two armies into one German Army. The two armies were built up in opposition to each other and integrated into opposing alliances. It was quite strange, indeed. In former times, I would have been arrested, if I merely for approaching the building; yet I had an office there and the Generals of the National Peoples' Army (NPA) reported to me. The State Security Service, the Communist Party and the National People's Army seemed to be a troika of terror before; at closer view it could be seen that the State Security Service had become the sinister apparatus, which was maintaining a state with a ruling Party, a Government and Troops, consisting of officers who felt 51% as Germans and only 49% as Communists, who were even proud of having returned more independency from the Soviet Union than their Federal Army comrades did against the Americans. I was able to realize that GDR intelligence concerning the western forces, including the weak points of our defence, was so detailed and precise, that it did not need any correction after the *fall of the Wall*, whereas it was, only after the fall of the Wall that the Federal Army came across departments and units whose existence and names they had never heard of before.

It was an ambition and a question of pride for the NPA to transmit their troops to the Federal Army in good order, in the hope of being treated with dignity and equal rights. The fusing of the troops did not turn out to become the big model it might have been for the interior Unity. Everybody in the rank of general or admiral was dismissed, although it would have been possible to reinsert some of them - carefully selected - into the Federal Army. We did not have bad experiences by entrusting the building-up of the Federal Army to generals who had loyally served the Führer and the Chancellor of the Reich before. Many officers of the National People's Army did not get the chance of democratic probation in their profession, although some of them were engaged as civil consultants afterwards. On the other hand, it is understandable that high-ranking officers of the old Federal Army just could not imagine their sons being commanded by former officers of the NPA. Yet, this is exactly what is required, if one wants to speak of integration, of a new Army, of real Unity, and precisely this is now appearing although on a low level.

At present huge weapon and equipment deposits have to be guarded, among them 1.200 tanks. The Baltic Sea contains the biggest marine cemetery in the world with 80 battle ships. It will take ten years to destroy the munition deposits alone, following environmental requirements.

Next to the Soviet Army, the National People's Army was the best-equipped, most modern army of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Its Eastern neighbours could modernize their equipment if we supplied them with our (Soviet-German) Main Battle Tank (T 72), which they do not have, but would like to have. Should Germany become an arms dealer on a large scale?

Years ago the project of the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA = Jäger 90) was justified by the fact that the Soviet Air Force with its MIG 29 disposed of the most modern aircraft existing world-widely at the time being. Now we have 28 of them, a gift of the Unity. It is really as good as we supposed, according to our Air Force. But, do we still need the European Fighter Aircraft which costs 135 million DM per unit according to actual calculations? It would cost only a 20 % if we ordered further MIGs 29 and helped the Soviet Union instead, who is neither enemy nor opponent any more. Of course, by doing so, we could not expect any applause by the armaments industry.

In the Federal Army the authorized number of soldiers amounts to 495.000 and to 170.000 in the National People's Army. Until the end of 1994, 370.000 of the 660.000 soldiers of German troops will remain, 300.000 thereof in the West and 70.000 in the East. We are therefore facing the most important reform of the Bundeswehr since its foundation. It would not be fair, to place less than 20 % of our troops in the East, which comprises 50 % of our former territory. Why do we need so many in the West? Are we threatened from there? In the long run, that is, after the retreat of the Soviets in 1994, it is intended that German troops will be proportionately stationed as this corresponds to the idea that no attack is expected.

Practically, this means territorial defence, troops essentially stationed on a permanent base with corresponding equipment, and it means troops, who are no longer able to perform big operations of defence or of attack. This is an essential detail of German troops since the end of the East-West conflict. I shall come back to the subject of the simultaneously necessary interventions in another connection.

The second aspect occurs, when by 1994 all German troops will be reduced to 370.000 soldiers, the Soviet troops have retreated behind their borders, the American troops will be reduced by two thirds, the withdrawal of the French troops on their territory has been accomplished and the reduction of other allied troops on our soil has drawn to a close: then one will have to ask, why the Germans still need so many soldiers, namely 370.000? The course might be set for further disarmament.

The first successful advance concession should be followed by a second one. Germany should consider reducing its troops to 250.000 men or even less after 1994. I don't know why we shall need more, without en-

emy or opponent, when our neighbours, not forgetting the Soviet Union, are furthermore reducing their troops.

For many reasons, I support a system of conscription. We need it now, more than ever, in order to integrate the East Germans. With 250.000 soldiers or less, this will no longer be possible, because then it would no longer be possible to establish 'justice in service'. The discussion about an even partly professional army will become inevitable, if disarmament is to be continued after 1994. The Soviet Union has decided to reduce its troops to 3 million soldiers - even unilaterally if necessary - to shorten the duration of military service and has started to consider whether to build up - partially - a Federal professional Army. This would be rather obvious especially for high-tech weapons.

It is all the more important to make sure that the Army does not become a state within the state, not even in Russia, but to integrate the country in controlled disarmament actions at European level. A similar professional German Army would represent neither internally nor externally a threat, because it would be as little independent as the actual Federal Army is right now. It is bound to NATO structures and will remain internationally integrated under civil control and command in the alliance or another similarly effective European system. National sovereignty is as much outdated in the field of security as it is in economy.

There is no exception to be made for Germany as a nation, after the Unity even less than before.

Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany stipulates that its troops can only be engaged in case of defence of the Federal territory or within a Collective Security System. The latter is not NATO, but an organization of the United Nations. The participation of our troops in the Gulf War was thus impossible.

I cannot share the criticism levelled at Germany in this connection. It is rather comforting that Germans do not like to shoot any more. We should be proud of the refusal, one could hear from Eastern Europe. In Great Britain we were even named cowards. The call 'Germans to the front' was heard by a strange coalition of right-wing extremists in Germany and westward.

An amendment to the Constitution will be necessary to clarify under which conditions other, than an act of aggression against the Federal Republic German, soldiers can be engaged.

If the use of force is inevitable, because all other means have failed, as it has been stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, Germany cannot withdraw behind the principle of letting other people fight and of paying for the intervention of others, possibly even their blood. This reflection refers already to the possibility, but not the obligation, of participating in peace-keeping actions of the United Nations; later, this would

be effective to support actions aiming at the restitution of peace. The Amendment to the Constitution should contain this possibility. It corresponds to the obligation we have undertaken by joining the United Nations. On the other hand, this obligation should exclude actions to which the United Nations entitle other nations, as in the case of the Gulf War.

It is probable and even desirable that development will be faster in Europe and that we obtain a System of Collective Security earlier in Europe than in the United Nations. As I have supported strongly the principle of Common Security, I cannot exclude Germany from participation in equal rights and obligations. Those who refuse to Europe Germany's Security partnership, prevent Europe.

A modification of the Constitution will enable Germany to participate in all actions under the control and the command of the United Nations, additionally within each system of Collective Security in Europe. Besides, permanently based territorial troops, a corresponding mobile and well-equipped modern Rapid Deployment Force has to be provided, which would be suitably equipped for any possible tasks - consisting of between 50.000 and 70.000 men. Germany should refuse the participation of its troops in any action like in the Gulf War and refuse, equally, any intervention force for actions outside the alliance, independently of the consideration of who started them, either NATO or the WEU. History and European interest justify this position.

It is strange, indeed, that just after the end of the East-West conflict Germany and Japan should modify their constitutions, in order to start military actions, or, to be more precise: in order to become better usable. The recently acquired sovereignty should not be misused in such a manner.

The achievement of internal Unity comes first on the priority list of German policy. Afterwards, we can turn to the grown responsibility, that the larger Germany undoubtedly has, and which it must not deny.

The starting point is the fact, that Germany has no territorial ambitions or claims. Its borders are its borders. The national interest of German foreign policy has become a European one. European stability, European security, and European collaboration beyond former system's borders in order not to become poverty borders, are the interests which have even genuinely become specific German ones.

The achievement of Europe comes first on the priority list of Germany's foreign policy; in short: to realize the Charter of Paris.

NATO, like Germany, having neither opponent nor enemy, is eagerly looking for new opponents and risks. Although it does not have a new strategy so far, it had already prepared plans for the troops becoming necessary. What Defence Ministers have conceived is truly grotesque. They want at least the same money for half the troops, thus eliminating

the peace dividend urgently needed for increasing stability in Eastern Europe. Undenied risks in Eastern Europe are used as arguments for decisions which would nourish or even create these risks. Thus, if new weapon systems are demanded, air- or sea-based nuclear weapons, one can be sure that potential target countries will feel threatened and provide themselves with same. At the moment, where each Dollar and each Mark is needed to eliminate non-military risks, the Ministers of Defence suggest that NATO starts a new armament race which practically means advance-armament. Hopefully, this will be prevented by the Government leaders, confirming the decision which has been taken by the US President without asking his allies.

The western defence alliance must not create threatening instruments against Eastern Europe - and especially the Soviet Union - nor towards developing countries south of the Mediterranean Sea. If the Soviet Union is not mentioned for psychological or political reasons, the intention will be there all the same, since Moscow will remain more powerful than Tripoli. After the abolishment of all medium range land-based missiles by the INF-convention (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces), Germany should insist that no new run is started in the remaining unregulated sector of air- and sea-based weapons. In our own, and in the interest of the Soviet Union, we should oblige them not to develop new weapons instead of giving them pretexts for doing so.

If we recognize this interest, the grown responsibility an expanded Germany demands a corresponding position which means: courage will be required to refuse qualitatively new armament.

A further consequence of the solemn Charter of Paris is the reinforcement of all-European cooperation and all-European structures. This means that NATO decides on new strategies without contacting the Eastern European countries including Moscow, before knowing about common worries and fears and so to enable planning in mutual knowledge. Otherwise, strategies against each other would be developed again.

Germany should not agree to any new strategy developed without knowledge of its Eastern partners. Neither should Germany agree to any new weapon-program, before the new strategy is adopted and before it is clear for what purpose which kind of troops are needed. Finally, Germany should refuse decisions which interfere with the promised growing-together of all-Europe. The Charter of Paris must not be violated by Germany.

The Ministers of Defence have suggested the old way: Western Europe under American leadership; in Copenhagen, the Foreign Ministers have put against it their model of an all-European collaboration. The Government Heads of State shall have to take a decision between the two alternatives this fall. In this connection, the increased German responsi-

bility has become entirely evident; against Germany no decision will be possible.

The question of the increased German responsibility on a more global scale remains unsolved. Here, we have to start with the very knowledge that security is to be defined less militarily, but more economically and *ecologically*. We, and especially the United Nations, have to develop global rules and reinforce global institutions. This leads to the suggestion, that a German Peace Corps should be established in which the service will be equated with the military service, which has to be equipped with the latest technology in order to fight against environmental damages of all kinds and which could be mobilized in case of environmental catastrophes and to offer humanitarian help. This could be done under national or international control. Such peace troops would be working in the Gulf and Iran right now, if we had them. In Germany, the peace troops would have a lot of work to eliminate the damages caused by foreign troops. They could be put under the command of the Home Ministry and could become an interesting model for conversion by collaborating with the economy, financed according to identical principles as those applied to the collaboration between Federal Army and economy.

The prevention of international conflicts and the development of crisis management, including the German engagement by people, knowledge and money, this is a field where the Federal Republic of Germany could develop ambition.

The word 'Ostpolitik' has been adopted by many languages. Ostpolitik was an attempt to overcome the East-West conflict by developing our own actions. Thus, it lasted from the building of the Berlin Wall until its fall. Now, European policy is substituting the Ostpolitik.

After both German states had lost their former leading powers, without intention of comparing them, in fact, German policy has now attained maturity, at least theoretically. After its westward orientation, has taken priority in German policy so far, its identity should now become all-European. It should jealously guard, that the surmounting of the European separation does not fail due to Germany. The establishment of national stability and inner Unity remain priority targets. As regards foreign policy, the German interest must be defined as a European one: the interest in establishing a stable independent Europe, where there can be no more war between its member states.

4. Armament and Disarmament in the New World

While the East-West conflict has been settled peacefully, the armament dynamics have continued without interruption. It is no exaggeration to say that the nineties will be a decade of qualitative armament rather than a

decade of disarmament, if nothing is done to stop such development. It is 'chic' to be modern. In connection with armament, a very modern element remains hidden behind the word 'modernization': the improvement of existing equipment. Nothing is said about improving steel helmets or increasing the precision of machine guns or even their range. None of these modernizations do change strategic options.

But, if it is a matter of technical innovation leading to drastic modifications of strategy, and further still, to new political and military options, this matter becomes dangerous. That is our situation right now.

Of course, it is impossible to forbid basic research or to control scientific progress, but the results of human inventive genius can equally be used for civilian as well as military purposes. Initially there is often a scientific idea, that will only later be recognized as being relevant for military purposes. According to SIPRI-data from 1987, approximately 750.000 of the 4 million scientists and engineers working in the field of science and development all over the world were directly concerned with military research and development, and they were by no means the worst of them. It is not only more interesting to develop electronic guns than to work on the improvement of refrigerators, but one gets a lot of more money for it, too. This year, in February, the American Minister of Defence, Richard Cheney declared when he presented the budget for 1992 and 1993: 'This will be a decade of development more than of production.'

Many sectors in physics, computer science, electronics, space technology, chemistry and biology are armament-relevant. Cheney has underlined 'that technology breakthroughs will change military art, as our Stealth fighters today played a disproportionate role in the air-war in Iraq'. In the Gulf-War, space was fully integrated in the actions from the start. It gave qualitative armament an impulsion in the direction of small, modern, high-tech, superior, unlimitedly expensive and may be even unpayable, if one is approaching it from a cost-benefit analysis.

Whether wars will become feasible again, when nowadays the quota of losses between the two sides amounts to the fantastic relation of 187 to more than 100.000, is a serious question, which does not touch the problem of ecological and political costs, whatsoever.

Weapon systems, which are studied in laboratories today, were science-fiction yesterday, become possible tomorrow. For instance, if one can successfully electronically start shells without a tube, in principle, all tanks can be thrown away. This result would not be that bad, but on the other hand, the newer strategic options eventually resulting from qualitative breakthroughs, create new security problems. One would not like to test them.

Against whom by the way? Against the Third World? After the end of the East-West conflict, the long standing approach to armament control

came to an end. In future, disarmament will have to include the quality of new technical developments. It would have been ridiculous to be proud of the abolishment of cavalry, whilst replacing it with the invention of the machine gun. It is also stupid to be able to control actual armament systems, whilst on the other hand, a new armament race is started with qualitatively new weapons.

Furthermore, one has to ask: a race against whom? Japan has proved that military spin-off is unnecessary to increase its economic weight. Russia needs its energies and capacities for economic recovery. America should be released from running a race against itself, because after the end of the East-West conflict nobody would join it in the race. In other words: in order not to let modernization continue out of habit, it has to be checked by contracts.

ABM was the first treaty forbidding weapons, which did not even exist and this was during an era of confrontation. It has since been leaked that the United States pushed forth its SDI program. But at times, when democratic partners and friends have established themselves in the Empire of Evil, it must become possible to make an agreement against senseless modernization, an agreement which can be controlled efficiently. The budgets for research programs should be reduced; lack of money is still an efficient disarmer, and money is what we urgently need for other arguably more important things. In this respect I can foresee agreements about a public disclosure of plans between laboratory and testing phases or between testing and introduction to the troops.

One thing has to be clear however: all plans for the present modernization and armament are children of confrontation. We must not let human inventive genius prolong or revive the problems deriving from the past world of confrontation.

What shall Europe do after the end of the East-West conflict and the collapse of Communism?

For quite some time I, too, have imagined that we should begin with security-political measures aiming at détente and arms reduction, moreover in order to overcome the political consequences of the European and German split. In 1968 after the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, I have formulated this task as follows: we must try to secure that the *Spring of Prague* takes place in Moscow, because in that case at least the Czechs would not march into the Soviet Union. Historically, this means trying to heal Eastern Europe from a disease called Communism. The way planned, therefore, was détente, small steps and negotiations with those who were in power, SED as well as CPSU, in spite of anything we knew. The way led through Helsinki, the renunciation of force concerning all borders in Europe, international law, economic collaboration and led to Common Security and the principle agreed on with the Communists, that peace - which means the common interest in

survival - is more important than any ideological dispute. On this basis one could and should disarm until mutual disability to launch an attack is reached. Later still, the opponents would become partners.

Before this happened, however, a democratic revolution took place. Security was overtaken by policy.

Now security makes its claim, which means the task of guaranteeing control and, by agreement, the inability to launch an attack. What used to be a peace-maker for the European house, has now to become guarantor for the European house.

Let us now briefly consider the question of nuclear weapons: these are not improved weapons, but of a new quality. Whoever unleashes them, risks the fate of his own nation.

Nobody should be entitled to have a say in the fate of a nation, not even your best ally. So, it is understandable that nuclear power is not shared with anybody else, in deciding whether or not to use nuclear weapons, not even America with Great Britain, let alone France with Germany. No German Chancellor will ever obtain not even the negative right of co-determination against the use of nuclear weapons, let alone veto right; as such a right would mean, that a German Chancellor would be able to extricate nuclear weapons from an American or French President.

There is a principal non-modifiable inequality between nuclear states, who represent a threat for the fate of other people and the non-nuclear states, who are unable to do so, on the contrary. This inequality cannot be removed.

It can only be relativized by the disposal of one's own territory. Non-nuclear states can decide whether or not to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. Non-nuclear states take their own decision, if they increase, modernize, reduce or scrap their arms. No non-nuclear state has even participated in the negotiations about this matter. Thus let the nuclear states be contented with their arms, if they believe them to be necessary for their happiness.

Ten years ago, I summarized the consequences thereof, in an Annex to the Palme-Report, in the following formula: no nuclear weapons on the territory of states, which do not already possess them.

In the case of war, the temptation to let off a firecracker with tactical nuclear weapons, which are unable to reach the destination of any other super-power and thereafter stop it, being terrified by the result, would be too great. Thereafter could have meant after the existence of my people. The technical differentiation between strategic and non-strategic weapons was the background for the American discussion about a limited war limited in Europe, and it was as a small additional matter, that a good French friend of mine said, that Pershing II would postpone the German unity for another 20 years. But, fortunately this since proved not to be the case.

If it was in the national interest to eliminate nuclear weapons from German soil before the end of the East-West conflict, this belief can certainly no longer be rejected now, with the reproach that we would play into the Soviet's hands by doing so.

I think that Germany should not only insist on removing all nuclear weapons and warheads, but also strictly refuse any further deployment of new nuclear arms on its territory. I believe that this is the interest of all non-nuclear states, too, but it has to be determined by each state on its own. Germany should adopt this position and leave it up to any other state to decide whether or not it wants to accept new air-based bombs on its territory.

The owners of nuclear weapons are able to produce new ones, if they have the necessary money. But, please, only on their own territory. It should become a principle of European security policy following the end of the East-West conflict, that nuclear weapons be exclusively deployed on the territory of their owners. This would mean more security, by the way; for American troops in Germany and elsewhere, too; they would benefit from the same security enjoyed by many millions of Europeans: that means: NO NUKES - NO TROOPS can no longer remain the American position.

Another very incomprehensible interest of the United States shall have to be modified: their refusal to include the Naval forces in disarmament talks. They began with START, but the whole complex area of cruise missiles has not been regulated. Some people in NATO speak of new risks resulting from the delicate situation in the Soviet Union, but they do not speak about the, as yet unlimited possibilities for the Soviet Union to increase their numbers of submarines equipped with nuclear weapons. The political instability and subsequent risks cannot be fought with weapons. An intervention by NATO is out of the question. The potential risk of existing sea-based nuclear weapons can only be excluded by controllable negotiation results.

This also applies to an enclosed sea, as for example, the Baltic Sea. It could apply to the Black Sea, too, but I do not dare to judge the complicated situation in the Mediterranean and would like to leave the oceans up to those who rule them and are experts in the matter. However, a limitation of nuclear naval armament is a real European interest. Europe should insist upon it.

If one tries to think about future security for and in Europe after the end of the East-West-conflict, since the German unification, and after the break-down of the former Soviet Union, it is obvious first and foremost, that military questions no longer play the role they formerly played during the past decades. Security used to mean protection against potential military threats; in the future, security will be the protection against

potential threat of poverty and denied human rights. The future price could be higher than the hitherto existing expenses.

Nevertheless, in the future, security in, and for Europe, has still or has again to be considered in military terms. One of the reasons is tradition, a more important one is the question of money, *i.e.* resources: as nobody can spend one Rubel or one Dollar, one Lira or Franc twice - all countries being short of money - one has to protect oneself from misinvestment. We cannot spend money on useless military equipment that will later mean that funds for necessary economic expenditure is lacking. The third reason is that wrong security approaches will certainly have undesired consequences.

Future structures of European security have to be considered from these points of view, proceeding from a definition of interests, and by analyzing what is desirable and what is not, what is probable and what is not, and what reality looks like today?

No doubt, the Western European interest is to reach a state where wars between countries are physically impossible. I think that in Eastern Europe this interest is shared. Obviously such a state cannot be reached without either sides, but only together.

Already here, very fundamental questions come to mind. I ask them as one of the 'fathers' of the idea of Common Security. Common Security was the result of the conclusion that war can no longer be won by either side. Nuclear weapons, and the sensitivity of our highly developed civilizations, have abolished any hope of winning a war in the classical sense of victory. As both sides face the alternatives of living together or dying together, they logically became partners of Common Security in spite of existing ideological or social controversies. Common Security was a doctrine made for the nuclear era with ongoing confrontation between East and West. This confrontation has now come to an end.

Therefore, the doctrine of Common Security, itself, has become obsolete. Politically NATO has put the former political opponent in the place of a potential friend. President Bush uses similar vocabulary. After all, the Charter of Paris was signed as an obligation and formulated pan-European collaboration, by which pan-European structures have first been decided upon, even if they are still weak.

To take this argument to its logical conclusion, the result will be that security in and for Europe is conceivable neither without, nor against, but only together with the former Soviet Union. We can now bring to a close the academic discussion, that beyond the area between the Atlantic and the Urals, there is another and even bigger area between the Urals and Vladivostok. During the negotiations on the Intermediate-Range-Nuclear-Forces-Treaty, which had already caused us a lot of trouble, but which was solved logically, by concluding the treaty with worldwide implementation and practically by including the United States and the

whole of Soviet territory. It is encouraging that Bush and Gorbachov did underline the security perspective for the area between Vancouver and Vladivostok.

Of course, pan-European security cannot be organized if the Soviet Union or Russia, east of the Urals, is allowed to build up forces of indefinite size and power without control. To contemplate European security including the Soviet Union, means to take into account the total area of the Soviet Union.

It is an open question, whether the Soviet Union wants that. Furtherstill, one cannot predict whether, the new union is prepared to face such considerations, but for sure, this will be so only if its own security interests are respected, as much as those of the West- or Central-European partners; anyhow, this would be a plausible consideration.

In this respect, let us come back to the relationship between America and Russia. A pan-European security system would not only constitute an element of security for Russia and the new Republics against America, but equally a buffer of security for America against them. Pan-European structures mean mutual control, the integration of staff and the participation of American and Soviet officers. As a matter of fact, which kind of interest, and which country will be harmed by this procedure? Of course America would have no longer a dominating position in Europe. It would be a partner with equal rights and obligations like any other European country.

The prevailing bilateral strategic relation of global weapons between Washington and Moscow would remain unaltered by this fact.

It would be regrettable, however, if America refused this position, because in doing so the economic differences between America and Europe might intensify. But for the purpose of conventional defence, Europe does not depend any longer on the American presence. It is able to protect itself against an attack by the Ukraine or Kasakstan, and even by Russia and in an European security system even more. The global umbrella of strategic weapons opened by Moscow and Washington, remains effective at least for the foreseeable future.

Thus, if one envisages a pan-European system of security, a shift has to be taken from the doctrine of Common Security to the one of Collective Security.

Collective Security means equal rights and obligations of all its partners aiming at mutual security. In other words: if one of the partners breaks the rules, all the other parties are aligned, or to be more precise, they are allies against the violator.

The second rule of Collective Security is the common defence against foreign aggression against all or only one of the parties.

Practically speaking, this means making our new friend, the Soviet Union, an ally, and vice-versa, all others would become its ally against

any kind of aggression. I do not think that the latter would be very risky, as an attack by China or Japan or Afghanistan or Iran, is very improbable.

Military structures should be determined for both internal and external security. They should lead to a mutual incapacity of attack whilst at the same time providing the necessary capacity for defence against an outside aggressor. In principle this leads to territorial forces, deployed for territorial defence according to the above principles. The Soviet Union and its border of more than 7000 km with China, demands, of course, more troops than for instance Germany, with its only some hundreds kilometres of border with Poland or France. This comparison is intended to show that a military threat to Germany coming from Poland or the Soviet Union need not be taken more seriously than a threat by France or Italy.

Besides having territorial forces, the integrated intervention of troops, *i.e.* modern and highly mobile troops under international command, would be necessary in order to put emphasis on the sanctions, to be met by any state violating the agreed obligations. These intervention forces, to which each participant state would have to contribute to an appropriate extent, should be sufficient to constitute a convincing military deterrent against hostility towards the political commitment.

Collective Security between Lisbon and Vladivostok, between partners with equal rights, would consist of conventionally equipped forces only. The nuclear weapons would remain exclusively at the disposal of their owners. But one cannot deny that such a system, deserving the name of European Peace Order, would raise the question of to what purpose the four nuclear powers still need nuclear weapons.

Of course, a European Peace Order with conventional troops envisages the United States as a physically present partner in a system, where the former conflict-orientated way of thinking and the conflict-potential of the former Soviet Union becomes obsolete. At the same time, by including the United States, such a system would be an instrument of security for the former Soviet Union.

Nuclear weapons would no longer be justified by mutual threat, but only by nuclear threats from a fifth nuclear power, China, or any other new nuclear power. Arsenals against such risks could have 1 to 2 percent of the current arsenals. This is more so since one can proceed on the assumption that China has developed its nuclear weapons for deterrence rather than to create a threat. It would not exclude itself from an association of nuclear powers with rules to prevent nuclear blackmail from the powers which are as yet non-nuclear. Here, a realistic perspective is on the horizon, not of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, but of a global regime reducing the current arsenals to a strict minimum. The Bush proposal, which can lead to a system of common command and control, takes the right direction.

I come to the conclusion that a European Peace Order based on conventional collective defence would practically free the world from the nuclear war threat and would thereby develop real global effects.

Two facts remain to be considered: *First*: what kind of political order will the former Soviet Union arrive at? *Second*: would such a collective order enable or demand interventions, for instance in the case of Yugoslavia?

To the first question: The Soviet power of veto in the Security Council of the United Nations can neither be divided nor multiplied by 10. The same applies to the continuation of the strategic START-negotiations which now have to include the navies. Space-deployed observation systems and air defence systems are launched from Baikonur which is situated in Kasakstan. Many arguments speak in favour of competence for security remaining in the hands of the Union accepting the consequences resulting from such a decision.

All Republics joining the Union would benefit from the pan-European guaranteed controlled conventional security against each other or against an external threat. There is no better security system for the Baltic Republics, Poland, the Union, or even Russia than the European one, the members of which are either individual states or the Union.

The European Peace Order of conventional collective security is sufficiently elastic to have practical effects, which means stability for the nations and republics with a view on Europe, and at the same time complete freedom of confederate or other constitutional structures of the Union.

But if southern Republics leave the Union and establish close political links, with their neighbours in the south, then in the field of security, they would of course no longer be part of the European Peace Order and could neither be obliged to abide by its rules nor expect its protection. Nobody can exclude the possibility that southern Republics, which are finding their way to independence, might try to help members of their nationality, who live in another state, for the purpose of self-determination or unification. These problems can occur with or without a European Peace Order. They could be diffused more easily with a European Peace Order, because, as I said before, such Republics or States could neither expect protection nor help from a European Peace Order.

To the second question: Partly when dealing with the new situation of the United Nations, and partly when dealing with the consequences for Europe of the termination of the East-West conflict, I had already mentioned the problem of minorities, of respect of human rights and, finally, of involvement in what we have so far considered as exclusively internal problems of states in the sense of the United Nations Charter. I do not want to repeat these issues. In respect of considerations concerning an

European Peace Order, this means that such an Order might be able to formulate and guarantee the new rights of peoples in and between the states and - in case of violation - to enforce them at an earlier date than the United Nations.

Now I come back to the question asked at the beginning of this discussion about the probable developments given the real situation.

Reality today is characterized by the factors of reliability and stability which are represented by NATO and the European Community, which is more than ever a West European creation, and, conversely a reality made by the former Soviet Union looking for new stability. Such a situation understandably needs precautions, in order not to risk an established order and not to obstruct new opportunities, but to make use of them: without putting anything at stake and in order not to gamble away ones chances.

The strongest argument in favour of a European Peace Order I dealt with in connection with my considerations on Russia, concerns the breakdown of the central state and the autocratic party system; provided that an outbreak of new national conflicts can at all be avoided, it could alternatively be achieved with a pan-European framework as a reference; a goal, a buffer - in simple terms: if we were to embrace Russia and its peoples instead of leaving them to their own devices.

Another way would be the consolidation of ones own security politics, in order to wait and see how the Republics of the Soviet Union consolidate themselves, which would mean a continuation of the doctrine of Common Security towards the Soviet Union instead of collectivity: the alternative lies somewhere between partnership and alliance.

This alternative will possibly soon be decided upon. If a new NATO strategy is to be determined, the Union of the Soviet Republics will also have to decide upon its own strategy; then we will have to deal with a Western European, and a Soviet, security system; hence there would be a danger that the two strategies would be set off against each other; in this case entirely different weapons and structuring of forces would of course be required. Unified security is entirely different from security against each other. Thus, the pan-European perspective, to which the nations and Republics of the former Soviet Union ought to be Parties, would not be created. In such a case it would be necessary to decide on what security means to, if at all, adopt for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the three Baltic States; will they get guarantees? If so, by whom? Will there be two systems of air control and defence in Europe? And what will the situation be like for the states situated in the vacuum between these two systems?

Finally, what are the risks for today's NATO, for which a new strategy will be developed? They can only come from outside. Outside will be include between the Oder and the Pacific, from the Northcape to the

border between Turkey and Iraq and Syria. So far, NATO is exclusively based on the doctrine of territorial integrity, that is, the defence of its members. If a doctrine of intervention - that is, the right of intervention, in order to defend ones interests outside the defined area - is to be formulated, for the first time, would it include interventions in the area of the former Soviet Union? It would be grotesque if NATO came to such conclusions after the end of the East-West conflict, which would make their declared friends opponents, at least to a small extent.

It is not surprising that Governments are inclined to conservative thinking, and do not discuss Collective Security for Europe, but it is really encouraging, that Washington and Bonn speak about cooperative regulations in the field of future security. Cooperation is like an overture to the opera of collectivity.

We live in times where tanks and troops in the Soviet Union have proved to be incapable of suppressing an elementary democratic movement. I cannot imagine any case where a military intervention of NATO would be justified or would be able to solve any kind of conflict in the former Soviet Union whatsoever. And I cannot see any weapons system that should be modernized or developed as a new phenomenon on the grounds of new risks in the East.

In the Charter of Paris, the European countries obliged eachother to develop pan-European structures. It would be a breach of the Charter, if the West adopted a new strategy without at least an obligation not to introduce it without consultation and possibly the agreement of the other Signatories to the Charter of Paris. Either NATO is going to open up for further states including the Soviet Union, and thus become the military structure of a European Peace Order, or we develop such structure based on the CSCE-principles.

It would be easy to continue Common Security between East and West, perhaps with a slight shift to the East; this perspective, however, speaks in favour of developing an European Peace Order of Collective Conventional Security. The first alternative was based on the logical progress after the end of the East-West-conflict, the second one has become possible after the break-down of the former Soviet Union.

The first alternative justifies, for instance, the development of a new modern fighter able to compete with the most modern Soviet aircraft; the second alternative has to take into account the ability of corresponding aircraft in China or India, in Iran or Libya. The issue is clearly that, we do not need to capitalise on the continuation of Soviet risks in the interest of our arms industry. If it goes as far as to misinvestments, we are going to lack the means necessary to diminish non-military risks for the West, that is the revolution of poverty.

Finally, there is another argument: it might take decades before the Soviet Union will be able to reach political and economic stability; se-

curity in and for Europe cannot wait such a long time. It has to be reached earlier, in a way which will enable it to support political and economic stability in the Soviet Union. This could be done by the European Peace Order.

A European Peace Order would be the best foundation for equipping our social order with the necessary means for defending ourselves against non-military attacks.

The idea of a European Peace Order creates the European Unity by collaboration. It is based on equality of its states, equality of rights for individuals and minorities and identical security for its peoples. All historical examples show that where this has been attempted by force, they drowned in blood and caused heaps of corpses. Now, for the first time, the European Unity is in sight since the end of the East-West conflict, and the end of Communism, and peace time with a certain peace. What an opportunity for history!



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